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Background 
A poet once described Sri Lanka as a tear 
dropped from the Indian face. Today the 
land, awash with unending violence, 
epitomizes this description. The ravaged 
island and its link to India remains un- 
brokenby the presence of approximately 
200,000 Sri Lankan refugees in India. 
The disaimination and violence by 
the Sri Lankan state against the Tamils 
throughout the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s 
form the backdrop to this refugee situa- 
tion. As the crisis deepened, small num- 
bers of Sri Lankan Tamil educated elite 
migrated. The majority went to the de- 
veloped West, the rest to neighbouring 
India. The expatriate community 
swelled and would in time provide sus- 
tenance to the movement. 
In 1983, the Sinhaleseviolence against 
the Tamils and Tamil insurgency re- 
sulted in the displacement of all commu- 
nities in the north and the east. These 
induded the Tamils, Tamil-speaking 
MuslimsandSinhalese settledin the east. 
India, for security reasons, could not 
overlooksuch political developments. Its 
fears were not unfounded, for the next 
step was the exodus+mssing the nar- 
row Palk Straits-into India. 
All the refugees who came to India in 
1983 took refuge in the state of Tamil 
Nadu, with a population of 55,638,318 
(1991 provisional census). By the early 
part of 1993, there were an estimated 
200,000 Sri Lankan Tamils. There is no 
exad number available as many do not 
register, despite local government or- 
ders. It is easy to remain undetected with 
many refugees living outside the camps. 
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The 8,0241 camp refugees are all regis- 
tered, as are the 1,714 in special camps. In 
outside camps 27,000 have been regis- 
tered. Despite threats of deportation and 
internment in special camps since 1993, 
the rest remain unregistered. The basic 
problem is the refugees fear of being 
branded militants and being deported or 
interned in the special camps. 
The Camps 
When the first wave of refugees entered 
India in 1983, they were divided into 
three groups. Besides the camp and non- 
camp refugees, there were the militants 
in special camps (Mohandas 1992; 
Karunanidhi 1990). 
The Refugee as Militant: Militant 
leadership has always been elitist 
and there is a clear line of distinction 
between them and the mass of refu- 
gees. The leadership drew its sup- 
port and recruited its forces from the 
refugee camps. These camps no 
longer exist. They were all dosed 
down after the assassination of Rajiv 
Gandhi, but their legacy continues to 
haunt the refugees. 
Noncamp Refugees: These are the 
refugees who do not receive finan- 
cial assistance from the government. 
They are mostly rich businessmen 
and professionals. They also include 
a small number of near destitute 
young men who are in India to es- 
cape from being recruited by the 
militants. Since Gandhi's assassina- 
tion, noncamp refugees have been 
moved into the camps for security 
reasons or have gone underground 
for fear of being interned in special 
camps. 
Ordinary Camp Refugee: There are 
132 camps in Tamil Nadu and one in 
Orissa. All refugee sin camps arereg- 
istered. This entitles them to govern- 
ment assistance-cash, shelter, 
health facilities, clothing and provi- 
sion of essential items. The refugees 
from Sri Lanka have been the recipi- 
ents of one of the most advanced 
systems of education in the world, 
but since 1991,this privilege hasbeen 
withdrawn. There is no uniformity 
in the camp facilities. Some are good, 
some are unsatisfactory. In the same 
way, the reception from some locals 
is good while others are hostile. 
Women have a number of social and 
psychological problems that con- 
tinue and increase with time. 
The Militant as Refugee 
With increasing militant activities in the 
state, in March 1990 Tamil Nadu refused 
to grant asylum to 1,638 Tamil Eelarn 
Liberation Organisation (TELO), Eelam 
National Democratic Liberation Front 
(ENDLF) and Eelam People's Revolu- 
tionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) cadres. 
They were then sent to Malkangiri in the 
state of Orissa. Today only the ENDLF 
members remain in this camp.& 200 
remaining refugees are very young. 
They have came from Trincomalee and 
Batticaloa. They are all in their twenties, 
and according to the security guards 
posted outside the camp, can dismantle 
and assemble a gun in seconds. Accord- 
ing to them they have all been trained by 
the Indian security forces. They are an 
army in waiting. When the right moment 
comes, they will, like their predecessors, 
escape away in the night. 
Their lifestyle is similar to that of the 
ordinary camp refugee in Tamil Nadu. 
The reason for providing a view of the 
militant camp is to show that the divid- 
ing line between the refugee and the 
militant is very thin indeed when it 
comes to the rank and file. It is the mili- 
tant leadership as mentioned earlier 
which is totally different. The mass of 
militants face the same problems as all 
refugees. The only difference is the fer- 
vour and the sparkle in the eyes of the 
men. Immaculately dressed, they do not 
have the mark of a downtrodden hu- 
manity. 
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Aid From NG09s 
No aid is asked of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) or voluntary agenaes for refu- 
gee rehabilitation in India. The central 
government provides the finances and 
the state, the infrastructure. India does 
not encourage international NGO's to 
work in the camps except the Red Cross 
(local branch). The only organizations 
allowed to work are those run by the 
refugees themselves. In the Sri Lankan 
camps, the largest voluntary organiza- 
tion working with the refugees is OFERR 
(organisation for Eelam Refugee Reha- 
bilitation). It is run by S.C. 
Chandrahasan, the son of the late Sri 
Lankan Tamil leader, S.J.V. 
Chelvanayagam. The working of this 
organization proves the effectiveness of 
refugee NGO's vis-a-vis international 
NGO's and the need for refugee leader- 
ship. Refugee NGO's know the needs of 
their people and leadership is a requisite 
to coordinate activities. 
Forced Repatriation 
Repatriation of Sri Lankan refugees took 
place in 1987 and 1991. The first repatria- 
tion took place after the signing of the 
Indo -Sri Lanka Peace Accord in 1987. It 
was voluntary in nature. After the first 
repatriation most of the camps were 
closed down (Public [Refugees] Reha- 
bilitation Department 1987, p.6), The as- 
sassination of former Indian Prime 
Minister Rajiv Gandhi, on May 21,1991, 
prompted the Indian government to re- 
patriate the refugee. For a year attempts 
at forcing the refugee to go back were 
made. The policy was ambivalent, not 
uniform and carried out by local officials. 
In some camps the refugees were ex- 
plained about the process of repatriation, 
given the option to stay and forms in 
Tamil were distributed. In other camps 
no explanation was offered. Some refu- 
gees signed the form without realizing 
what it meant because it was given by the 
officers who distributed the cash assist- 
ance. Others who did understand that it 
was a returnee form signed it under pres- 
sure from the officer concerned under a 
threat that if they did not do so, no further 
assistance would be given. As a result 
30,000 signed the repatriation consent 
forms. 
India, which had never turned back 
genuine refugees, or used force in repa- 
triationblotted its record in this case. The 
reasons were not related to any formal 
change in policy towards refugees. It was 
a reaction to the assassination of its Prime 
Minister. According to the Sri Lankan 
refugee it reflected the view that "unless 
all Ceylon Tamil Refugees were repatri- 
ated, the activities of the L'ITE could not 
be curbed in India." The answer was not 
so simple. Increasing militancy and the 
assassinbeinga Sri Lankan were the cata- 
lyst in a complex situation of national 
politics. 
The Entry of the UNHCR 
India is not a signatory to the UN 
Convention on Refugees, and the 
UNHCR has not been allowed to work in 
India. During the Tibetan crisis in 1959, 
and the Bangladesh crisis of 1971, the 
only help taken from UNHCR was finan- 
cial. But in a surprise move on the July 27, 
1992 India signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding with the UNHCR. 
Before the entry of the UNHCR, the 
Government of India had repatriated 
23,126 persons between the January 20, 
1992 and May 15, 1992 (UNHCR). 
Though it has the legitimacy to work 
from Indian temtory and opened its first 
office in India, in Madras, it is on a very 
limited mandate. Sunil Thapa, the Repa- 
triation officer who had earlier worked 
in the UNHCR operation in Sri Lanka, 
said that at that moment their work was 
confined to interviewing refugees. All 
those who signed the returnee forms are 
interviewed in Transit camps to ascer- 
tain whether the repatriation is forced ar 
voluntary. UNHCR has no financial 
commitment. All financial help in repa- 
triation to the refugee comes from the 
Government of India. 
It is obvious that the UNHCR pres- 
ence has deterred any forcible repatria- 
tion. At the same time it cannot be 
overlooked that of the 2,938 persons 
screened by UNHCR only 90 withdrew 
their applications for repatriation 
(UNHCR). Thus no general conclusion 
can be drawn that total repatriation was 
forced, a number of refugees did go back 
voluntarily. UNHCR officials now wait 
in Madras for repatriation to restart but 
the refugees are not interested in going 
back. The channels of communication 
open through their network show a very 
confused scene in Sri Lanka. 
Women refugees in the camp (Photo D. Krishnan) 
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Despite the UNHCR's presence and 
rolein rehabilitation, studies and reports 
by refugees on the returnee camps estab- 
lished the facts that the situation in Sri 
Lanka is not conducive to return. Refu- 
gees have gone from a camp in India to a 
camp in Sri Lanka. According to refugee 
sources in areas such as Trincomalee re- 
settlement in urban areas has been possi- 
ble, but not in nual areas. As the majority 
are from rural areas they continue to lan- 
guish in camps. Refugees have always 
established their own i n f o d  channels 
of communication and the reports from 
Sri Lanka on existing conditions has not 
created a confidence to return 
Waradakumar also provides an insight 
into camp conditions in Sri Lanka). 
Impact on host society 
The presence of the Sri Lankan Tamil has 
had immense influence on the host sod- 
ety. Its politics and society became 
deeply involved with the issue. A warn- 
ing was sounded that sooner or later 
Prabhakaran and his ideology would 
havea "profoundinfluence on the minds 
of Tamil Nadu youth, and the effect of 
such an influence willbe a volcanic erup- 
tion which cannot be neutralized (Thillai 
Rajah, 7)' Though the situation is not as 
grave as predicted, the impact on Tamil 
Nadu's politics, police, bureaucracy and 
society has been increasingly felt. 
Conclusion 
The impad of the assassination of Rajiv 
Gandhi had far reaching consequences 
on the refugee. An environment was ae- 
ated which brought about changes both 
in their lifestyles and acceptance by the 
host country. The immediate response of 
the government and people was that it 
ws difficult to differentiate between the 
militants and refugees so all Sri Lankan 
Tamils should be deported. 
The support the refugee has provided 
to the militant either willingly or under 
duress has proved costly for them in the 
long run. In the initial euphoria of the 
Tamil Eelam the authentic refugee 
gained, but as militant and related activi- 
ties increased in the state, the refugee 
began to suffer. In most cases it was not 
directly but by a negative fall out. Ac- 
cording to many local Tamils, the local 
support is either by reflex or has van- 
ished completely in some places. 
The above scenario shows that the Sri 
Lankan Tamil is no longer welcome. But 
the fact is that the crisis is nowhere near 
resolvingand the problematic issues that 
leave the refugee environment un- 
changed and that can result in further 
flows are many. The ethnic problem is 
the major issue, though in a different 
dimension. It is beingincreasinglyrecog- 
nized that the ethnic issue cannot be 
solved simply with the cessation of hos- 
tilities between the Sinhalese and the 
Tamils and settlement of their dispute. 
This is because the Tamil community is 
itself divided. The divide between the Sri 
Lankan Tamil and the Indian Tamil, the 
Sri Lankan Tamil and the Muslim Tamil 
and between the Sri Lankan Tamils 
themselves in the north and north east is 
widening. 
The assassination of President 
Premadasa on May 1,1993 will compli- 
cate matters and the refugees in India 
realize that there is no easy solution to the 
problem. Despite this, they themselves 
have provided recolmendations which 
could bring some relief to them. 
The major items on their agenda in- 
clude India's continuance of a major role 
in settlement of issues. Havingbecome a 
party, they say, it should continue to play 
an important part in the process of settle- 
ment. As Sinhala intransigence remains, 
they feel that international pressure 
should be applied simultaneously. In the 
meantime an interim arrangement to 
ensure security and safety of refugee 
returnees in Sri Lanka would facilitate 
discussion. 
They feel that improvement in their 
status can result if India accedes to the 
United Nations Convention regarding 
refugees. It should also strengthen the 
role of the UNHCR. Repatriation on a 
bilateral basis without giving 
importance to the refugees 
contravenes their human 
rights, they say . The agree- 
ment should be, they contend, 
at least be tripartite with the 
UNHCR as a third party. It 
should also cover resettle- 
ment andintegrationof policy 
implementation in India and 
Sri Lanka. 
Indian policy they main- 
tain should b-4 more humani- 
tarian and less political. It 
should handle the refugee on 
a humanitarian basis alone 
and refugee assistance until 
their return should not be 
seen as a temporary phase. 
Provision of education and 
opportunity to gain skills be 
restored. It should sustain the 
32 Rejiigw, Vol. 13, No. 3 (June 1993) 
